

Message Text

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OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00
DOE-15 SOE-02 NRC-05 ACDE-00 /100 W
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O R 191742Z APR 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2810
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL 19 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 168TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, THE
LAST OF THE FOURTEENTH ROUND, WHICH WAS HELD ON APRIL 19
UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF BELGIAN REP (SMOLDEREN),
FRG REP (BEHREND) AND SOVIET REP TARASOV DELIVERED THE
ONLY STATEMENTS. THE SOVIET PRESENTATION IS REPORTED
BY SEPTEL. THE FRG STATEMENT FORMALLY INTRODUCED THE
NEW ESTERN INITIATIVE INTO THE TALKS AND STRESSED ITS
SIGNIFICANCE AS A STEP TO MEET MAJOR EASTERN
CONCERN AND TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS DECISIVELY FORWARD
TOWARD A FIRST AGREEMENT. THE FULL ENGLISH TEXT, AS
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APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, OF THE STATEMENT, WHICH
WAS DELIVERED IN GERMAN, FOLLOWS BELOW: BEGIN TEXT:

WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE FROM THE OUTSET OF THESE
TALKS STRESSED THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AGREED GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS,
NAMELY THE ENHANCING OF STABILITY AND THE STRENGTHENING OF

PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE THROUGH AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE BEEN GUIDED BY THE CONVICTION THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THAT GOAL REQUIRES BOTH SIDES TO ADOPT AN APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS AT ONCE EQUITABLE, PRACTICABLE AND BASED ON A CORRECT ASSESSMENT OF THE EXISTING SECURITY SITUATION.

THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION IS CONSISTENT WITH THESE REQUIREMENTS.

FIRST, IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO A REAL ENHANCEMENT OF STABILITY AND SECURITY, WESTERN PROPOSALS AIM AT AN OVERALL OUTCOME OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS WHICH IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY.

SECOND, WESTERN PROPOSALS MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE KEY DESTABILIZING FACTORS IN THE AREA, THAT IS TO SAY WITH THE EXISTING EASTERN NUMERICAL ADVANTAGES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THEY ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTING GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES OF THE EAST.

THIRD, THE WEST PROPOSES A SELECTIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO COPE WITH THE ISSUE IN A REALISTIC WAY AND TO AVOID THE CONTRACTUALIZATION

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OF EXISTING DISPARITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

FOURTH, WESTERN PROPOSALS INCORPORATE THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS IN CONJUNCTION WITH SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON RESIDUAL LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA. SUCH CEILINGS ARE NECESSARY TO PRESERVE WESTERN SECURITY UNDIMINISHED, BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, DO NOT INFRINGE UPON LEGITIMATE EASTERN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

FIFTH, THE WEST STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF STABILITY IN THE AREA.

SIXTH, WESTERN PROPOSALS ALSO PAY DUE REGARD TO THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST SAFEGUARD AND NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES.

WE CONSIDER THAT THESE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN APPROACH ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR FULFILLING THE TASK OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

REGRETTABLY, 4 1/2 YEARS OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE

NOT RESULTED IN AN AGREEMENT. THIS IS DESPITE THE FACT THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE, DURING THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, MADE SIGNIFICANT MOVES TO MEET SPECIFIC EASTERN CONCERNS. IN PARTICULAR, IN DECEMBER 1975, THE WEST MADE A MAJOR MOVE TO MEET REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED EASTERN CONCERNS ON NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. THESE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ARE OF GREAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND REPRESENT IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE OUTCOME WHICH THE WEST HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED IN 1973.

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OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00
DOE-15 SOE-02 NRC-05 ACDE-00 /100 W
-----084456 191927Z /62

O R 191742Z APR 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2811
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
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IN CONTRAST, THE EAST SO FAR HAS NOT DISPLAYED COMPARABLE WILLINGNESS TO GEAR ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION TO THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH THE EAST'S PROPOSALS OF FEBRUARY 1976 WERE A LIMITED MOVE TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION ON PHASING, THESE PROPOSALS LEFT UNALTERED THE OUTCOME INITIALLY ENVISAGED BY THE EAST IN ITS DRAFT TREATY OF 1973.

ALTHOUGH THE EASTERN ATTITUDE HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTING, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE BY MEANS OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

OUR GOVERNMENTS ARE DETERMINED TO DO ALL WITHIN THEIR
POWER TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION
AND LIMITATION OF FORCES AND ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN
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CENTRAL EUROPE. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WESTERN
PARTICIPANTS HAVE DECIDED TO INTRODUCE FURTHER PROPOSALS
IN VIENNA.

THESE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS TWO
PRINCIPAL INTERESTS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED BY EASTERN PARTICI-
PANTS. FIRST, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE FREQUENTLY INSISTED
ON THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC GUARANTEES IN A FIRST PHASE
OF NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THE
PARTICIPATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND
CANADA IN A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS. SECOND, EASTERN
PARTICIPANTS HAVE STRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE WESTERN
REQUIREMENT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF AN ENTIRE SOVIET TANK
ARMY IN A FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THEY
HAVE CLAIMED THAT, IN DEMANDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF A COMPLETE
SOVIET TANK ARMY WITH ALL ITS ASSOCIATED ARMAMENTS AND
EQUIPMENT, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE ASKING FOR REDUCTIONS
WHICH WOULD LEAVE A GAP IN WARSAW TREATY DEFENSES AND WHICH
WOULD RESULT IN THE LIMITATION OF THE FULL RANGE OF SOVIET
GROUND FORCE ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA.

THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOW DECIDED
ON A MAJOR NEW MOVE WHICH DEALS DIRECTLY WITH THE TWO
PRINCIPAL EASTERN CONCERNS TO WHICH I HAVE JUST REFERRED.
THIS MOVE IS INTENDED TO BE A DECISIVE STEP TOWARDS
REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS
IN CENTRAL EUROPE LEADING TO ENHANCED STABILITY ON THE BASIS
OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES.

ON BEHALF OF ALL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS I WISH TO
INTRODUCE THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS:

"1. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WISH TO PRESENT TO THE EAST THE
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FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE EXISTING WESTERN PROPOSALS. THESE
CHANGES ARE CONDITIONAL ON EAST/WEST AGREEMENT ON MANPOWER
DATA. THOSE ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN PROGRAM WHICH ARE NOT
DEALT WITH IN THIS INITIATIVE REMAIN AS THEY HAVE BEEN
PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED.

2. THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

I. PHASE I COMMITMENTS REGARDING PHASE II REDUCTIONS

3. IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE TWO SIDES WOULD SPECIFY: FIRST, THE OVERALL TOTALS OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN PHASE II BY THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND BY THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION RESPECTIVELY, AS WELL AS THE AMOUNT OF THE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN PHASE II BY THE US AND USSR, IN ORDER TO REACH THE AGREED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING; AND SECOND, THE TIMING OF THESE PHASE II REDUCTIONS.

4. AS REGARDS THESE PHASE II REDUCTIONS, THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO EITHER OF TWO ALTERNATIVES:

ALTERNATIVE ONE

IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT, BOTH SIDES WOULD PROVIDE THAT THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN IN PHASE II IN TWO REDUCTION STAGES:

(1) IN THE FIRST OF THESE TWO STAGES, EACH SIDE WOULD MAKE REDUCTIONS CALCULATED BY TAKING AN AGREED EQUAL PERCENTAGE OF 40 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS STILL NEEDED BY THAT SIDE TO REACH THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING AFTER THE AGREED PHASE I REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND USSR HAVE BEEN DEDUCTED. THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD CONFIDENTIAL

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BE TAKEN COLLECTIVELY BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR. THESE FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME, SAY TWO YEARS, AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

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OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00
DOE-15 SOE-02 NRC-05 ACDE-00 /100 W
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O R 191742Z APR 78

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2812
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
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(2) IN THE SECOND OF THESE TWO STAGES, EACH SIDE WOULD ALSO REDUCE BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE OF 60 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT NEEDED TO COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING AFTER THE AGREED PHASE I REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN DEDUCTED. THE NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE US AND USSR IN THIS STAGE AND THE OVERALL TOTALS OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THIS STAGE BY THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND BY THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USSR RESPECTIVELY WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN PHASE I. THESE SECOND STAGE REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT, E.G. THREE YEARS.

(3) SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DETERMINE THE MODALITIES OF THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS ESTABLISHED IN PHASE I AND DEAL WITH OTHER TOPICS WHICH MAY BE RAISED BY THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PARTICIPANTS.

ALTERNATIVE TWO

(1) IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE OVERALL TOTALS OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN PHASE II BY ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND BY ALL EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USSR RESPECTIVELY, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN PHASE II BY THE US AND THE USSR, TO REACH THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING, WOULD BE SPECIFIED. THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING FOR AGREED US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IN PHASE I AS THE WEST HAS PROPOSED.

(2) THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DETERMINE THE MODALITIES OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS ESTABLISHED IN PHASE I AND DEAL WITH OTHER TOPICS WHICH MAY BE RAISED BY THE PARTICIPANTS. A COMMITMENT IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THAT THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME, SAY THREE YEARS, FROM THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT.

5. IN BOTH ALTERNATIVES, PHASE I WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THAT, IF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT RESULT IN TIMELY AGREEMENT, EACH SIDE WOULD NEVERTHELESS IMPLEMENT THOSE PHASE II REDUCTIONS SPECIFIED IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

II. PHASE I WITHDRAWALS

6. AS REGARDS SOVIET WITHDRAWALS IN PHASE I:

(1) THE WEST HAS PROPOSED THAT IN PHASE I, THE
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SOVIET UNION SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS TO THE USSR A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF 5 DIVISIONS INCLUDING 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

(2) THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE WILLING TO CHANGE THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF A COMPLETE SOVIET TANK ARMY WITH 68,000 MEN, 1,700 TANKS AND ALL OTHER EQUIPMENT TO THE EXTENT THAT:

(A) THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS TO THE USSR NOT A COMPLETE TANK ARMY, BUT 68,000 SOLDIERS, 5 DIVISIONS, AND 1,700 TANKS.

(B) THE WEST WOULD NOT INSIST ON THE WITHDRAWAL BY THE SOVIET UNION OF ARMAMENTS OTHER THAN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

(C) RESIDUAL HOLDINGS OF SOVIET COMBAT EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN TANKS WOULD NOT BE PLACED UNDER ANY LIMITATIONS.

(D) LIMITATIONS WOULD, HOWEVER, BE IMPOSED ON THE OVERALL RESIDUAL TOTAL OF SOVIET GROUND MANPOWER, ON THE COMBINED TOTAL OF SOVIET AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER, AND ON SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

7. THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD SPECIFY THAT THERE WILL BE NO LIMITATION ON THE OVERALL NUMBER OF US AND SOVIET UNITS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OR ON THE LOCATION OF SUCH UNITS INSIDE THAT AREA.

8. AS REGARDS PHASE I US WITHDRAWALS, THE US WOULD BE
PREPARED TO AGREE THAT APPROXIMATELY TWO-THIRDS OF ITS PHASE
I MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS
OR SUBUNITS.

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DOE-15 SOE-02 NRC-05 ACDE-00 /100 W
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O R 191742Z APR 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2813
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO
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9. THE US AND USSR, PRIOR TO SIGNING A PHASE I
AGREEMENT, WOULD EXCHANGE LISTS, WHICH WOULD CONTAIN THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS TO
BE WITHDRAWN IN PHASE I:

- (1) COMPLETE MILITARY IDENTIFICATION
- (2) GARRISON LOCATION
- (3) PERSONNEL STRENGTH (THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL THAT
WILL BE REDUCED WHEN THE ORGANIZATION IS WITHDRAWN).

III. ASSOCIATED MEASURES

10. THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO
ATTACH GREAT WEIGHT TO ASSOCIATED MEASURES, THAT IS, STABI-
LIZING, VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES, APPLICABLE

IN BOTH REDUCTION PHASES FOR INCREASING MILITARY
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STABILITY IN EUROPE. THESE MEASURES WOULD, IN OUR VIEW,
HELP REDUCE THE RISKS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND INCREASE
CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE WEST WILL THEREFORE
ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A
MATTER TO BE AGREED IN PHASE I.

IV. CLOSING REMARKS

11. IN CONCLUSION, THE WEST IS PREPARED TO AGREE TO
THE FOREGOING POINTS IF THE EAST IS PREPARED TO AGREE IN
PHASE I TO THE SOVIET AND US REDUCTIONS SPECIFIED ABOVE AND
TO A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AT
ABOUT 700,000 MEN AND ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER AT
ABOUT 900,000 MEN WHICH WOULD BE REACHED BY FURTHER REDUCTIONS
IN PHASE II. THESE PROPOSALS ARE ALSO MADE ON
THE CONDITION THAT AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON MANPOWER DATA,
AND THAT COMMITMENTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN PHASE I REGARDING
THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS ARE RESTRICTED TO
THOSE PROPOSED BY THE WEST, NAMELY ON SOVIET MAIN BATTLE
TANKS AND THE SPECIFIED US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS."

THIS COMPLETES MY PRESENTATION OF THE NEW WESTERN
PROPOSALS. IN THE INTEREST OF CLARITY, THE ENGLISH TEXT
OF THESE PROPOSALS IS ATTACHED TO THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT.
I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE MAJOR ASPECTS OF THESE
PROPOSALS.

FIRST, THE WEST IS NOW OFFERING TO UNDERTAKE IN PHASE I
A COMMITMENT ON THE OVERALL AMOUNT AND TIMING OF MANPOWER
REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN PHASE II BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA. THE WEST HAS OFFERED TWO
ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO IMPLEMENT THIS COMMITMENT. THIS COMMITMENT
WOULD CONSTITUTE A FIRM GUARANTEE THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN
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AND CANADIAN REDUCTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE WITHIN AN AGREED
PERIOD OF TIME AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT.
THUS THIS PROPOSED COMMITMENT IS A VERY IMPORTANT MOVE TO
MEET EXPRESSED EASTERN INTERESTS.

SECOND, THIS INITIATIVE WOULD CHANGE THE REDUCTIONS
ENVISAGED FOR PHASE I. IT WOULD REDUCE REQUIREMENTS ON
THE USSR, WHICH WOULD NOW BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW 68,000

SOLDIERS, 5 DIVISIONS, AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THIS TANK REDUCTION SHOULD INCLUDE ALL MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE 5 DIVISIONS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WILL ALSO NOTE THAT THE WEST IS ASKING FOR RESIDUAL LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET MANPOWER AND ON MAIN BATTLE TANKS ONLY, AND THAT NO LIMITATIONS ARE BEING SOUGHT ON SOVIET ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

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OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00
DOE-15 SOE-02 NRC-05 ACDE-00 /100 W
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O R 191742Z APR 78

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2814

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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THIS PROPOSAL TAKES ACCOUNT OF REPEATED EASTERN OBJECTIONS TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY WITH ALL ITS ARMAMENTS.

AT THE SAME TIME THE PROPOSAL REFLECTS THE CONTINUED WESTERN CONVICTION THAT THE LARGE NUMERICAL EASTERN SUPERIORITIES IN GROUND FORCES CONSTITUTE THE MOST DESTABILIZING ELEMENT IN THE EXISTING SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

THE PROPOSAL IS MADE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE WEST WILL,

THROUGH EFFECTIVE ASSOCIATED MEASURES, RECEIVE THE ASSURANCE
IT HAS ALWAYS SOUGHT THAT AN AGREEMENT WILL BE RESPECTED.

AS WE HAVE INDICATED IN THE TEXT OF OUR PROPOSALS, THE
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WESTERN PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO ATTACH
GREAT WEIGHT TO ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

I WISH TO REITERATE THAT THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE IS
CONDITIONAL ON EAST/WEST AGREEMENT ON MILITARY MANPOWER DATA,
WHICH IS THE MAJOR OPEN ISSUE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONSIDER THAT THE LATEST WESTERN
PROPOSALS DEAL IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY WITH THE OTHER
MAJOR OPEN ISSUES OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, THAT IS, WITH
PHASE I REDUCTION COMMITMENTS REGARDING PHASE II REDUCTIONS
AND WITH PHASE I REDUCTIONS AS SUCH, INCLUDING THE ISSUE
OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS.

ASSUMING THAT AGREEMENT ON DATA IS ULTIMATELY ACHIEVED,
THESE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD PROVIDE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
BASIS FOR REACHING A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.

THE WEST BELIEVES THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR AN EFFORT
BY ALG PARTICIPANTS TO OVERCOME THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES
AND TO ENTER INTO A DECISIVE PHASE OF NEGOTIATION OF A FIRST
PHASE AGREEMENT.

WHETHER OR NOT THE NEGOTIATION NOW ACTUALLY DOES ENTER
A DECISIVE STAGE DEPENDS ON THE RESPONSE WHICH EASTERN
GOVERNMENTS MAKE TO THIS NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE.

ACCORDINGLY, IF THE EAST SERIOUSLY DESIRES TO MOVE
TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES CONSIDER THAT
THE EAST SHOULD ACCEPT THE WESTERN APPROACH AS REVISED BY
THE PRESENT PROPOSALS. END TEXTRESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, AGREEMENTS, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS, PRESS CONFERENCES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MBFRV00239
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780168-0119
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780440/aaaabhwz.tel
Line Count: 588
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
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Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
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Review Event:
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Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2920686
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL 19 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT AT THE 168TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, THE LAST OF THE FOURTEENTH ROUND, WHICH WAS HELD ON AP
TAGS: PARM, GE, UR, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/68888bab-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014